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Abstract
A number of contributions have found evidence for motherhood being a critical life
event for women’s employment careers. This study presents a detailed model for the du-
ration of maternity leave in which young mothers can make a transition into a number of
states related to employment and unemployment among others. The model incorporates
a large number of factors including the legal framework, individual and firm character-
istics. We provide a comprehensive picture of the sorting mechanisms that lead to the
differentiation of women’s employment careers after birth. Our empirical evidence is de-
rived from large linked administrative individual labour market data from Germany for a
period of three decades. We obtain unprecedented insights how women’s skills, the quality
of the previous job match, firm level characteristics, labour market conditions and leave
legislation are related to the length of maternity duration.
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1 Introduction
The transition to motherhood can be considered a critical life event for women’s subsequent
employment careers. Whereas prior to the first birth a high and increasing share of women
are working full-time, there appears to be a strong differentiation of career paths afterwards
with many women returning only part-time or not returning at all (Angrist and Evans 1998,
Lundberg and Rose 2000, Gjerdingen and Center 2005, Baxter et al. 2008, Schober 2013). In
fact, Gustafsson et al. (1996) find that differences in female labour force participation across
Sweden, Germany and Great Britain are solely due to post-birth differences. Moreover, there
are numerous studies suggesting persistent wage losses from motherhood that seem to be largely
driven by birth-related work interruptions and the subsequent return to reduced working hours
(Waldfogel 1997; Budig and England 2001; Phipps et al. 2001; Baum 2002; Gangl and Ziefle
2009; Viitanen 2012). Birth-related career interruptions thus appear to be an important de-
terminant of the family and gender wage gap as has already been suggested by Mincer and
Polacheck (1974). Hence, whether, when and how a mother returns to the labour market after
a child-related work interruption becomes a crucial research question.
In fact, even among women who give birth to their first child and have all been working full-
time prior to birth, the related work interruption leads to a strong differentiation of subsequent
labour market paths as suggested by Figure 11. The figure shows the proportion of German
women who end their birth-related work interruption by either returning to their previous job
in full-time or part-time, by taking up a job with another employer, delivering another child or
starting a period of unemployment, education or training. In addition to suggesting a strong
differentiation of women’s labour market paths after birth, the figure also indicates that there
have been notable changes across the observation period between 1980 and 2000, thus raising the
question as to what drives this differentiation process. In fact, yielding better insights into this
process is of major concern since the transitions are differently desirable for mothers, employers
and the economy as a whole. For employers, for example, work interruptions, especially by
women with long tenure and good job performances, are costly because firm-specific human
capital may get lost and can be substituted for only by a costly hiring and training process of
new employees (Alewell and Pull 2001). Moreover, a fast return to the pre-delivery employer
has been found to reduce the wage loss from motherhood (Baum 2002; Waldfogel 1997; Phipps
et al. 2001; Ziefle 2004) which is desirable both from the perspective of mothers as well as the
economy as a whole. Furthermore, staying attached to the labour market should be preferable
from the individual as well as societal perspective if future career options are to be preserved.
1For details on the data source and definition see section 3.
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Figure 1: Share of observed transitions after inactivity by year of birth, 1985-2005.
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In a cross-country comparison of European countries, Gutierrez-Domenech (2005) find that the
impact of first birth on women’s subsequent careers is strongest in Germany. Among those
employed one year before birth, only around 50 percent are working five years after birth
compared to two thirds in most other countries. Moreover, this share of working mothers is
only few percentage points higher than two years after birth. Understanding the initial sorting
process is thus of particular relevance in the German context
Therefore, the goal of this paper is to gain deeper insights into a woman’s decision process after
first birth. We do so by estimating a competing risk model for the out of work duration of
previously full-time employed mothers who can return to either of the states shown in Figure
1. In particular, we examine how the return decision is related to various factors such as
women’s productivity, the pre-delivery job match quality, the characteristics of the previous
employer, leave policies, labour market conditions, and child care availability. We can perform
such a detailed analysis because we use German administrative individual data for a period of
more than two decades that records the exact date of births, the employment history including
information on employers. Moreover, we can exploit changes in leave regulations, childcare
availability and aggregate labour market conditions across a long period. This comprehensive
approach closes several research gaps in the existing literature.
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First of all, most of the literature focusses on the decision of women to return to either employ-
ment in general or the previous job. There are only few exceptions that also consider ”next
birth” (Lalive and Zweimu¨ller, 2009), full- vs. part-time employment (Ondrich et al., 2000) or
the probability to return to the previous employer (Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck 2014). However,
women can typically choose between a much broader range of options that may subsequently
affect their employment careers. By allowing for a much broader range of career options within
a competing risks model, our analysis improves our understanding of the decision when and
how to return to the labour market since a negative relationship for one risk could otherwise
be leveled out by a positive relationship for another risk.
Secondly, much of the literature focusses on the impact of leave policies only. By exploiting
policy reforms for identification, most studies find that a longer maximum leave duration induces
mothers to delay the job return, see Baum (2003) for the US, Hanratty and Trzcinski (2009)
for Canada and Ondrich et al. (2003), Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009), Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck
(2014) for Austria and Germany. Moreover, more generous leave policies also appear to be
associated with reduced post-birth labour supply and wages, even though the evidence is not
fully conclusive, see Gangl and Ziefle (2009) for a review. Compared to the numerous studies
on the impact of leave policies, however, only few studies aim at a broader analysis of the
determinants of women’s return decision. For the US, Leibowitz et al. (1992) and Klerman
and Leibowitz (1994), for example, focus on the impact of women’s skills, family income and
child care options. Fitzenberger et al. (2010) derive first detailed insights into the relationship
of firm and individual characteristics and the distribution of maternity leave duration, but
their analysis is restricted to employees from one large German firm. Our study exceeds this
literature by examining the relevance of a broad set of factors in determining the post-birth
differentiation in labour market states using a large random sample of individual administrative
records covering a period of more than two decades. This will provide insights for policy makers
and employers how individual, firm and job characteristics as well as the institutional setting
and general labour market conditions are related with a woman’s return decision after birth.
Hence, our results may help politics to design leave policies and employers to develop a human
resource management that decrease the likelihood for long, potentially career-damaging out of
work periods.
Thirdly, with the exception of Fitzenberger et al. (2010), the literature estimates the proba-
bility of a return to the labour market at one or a small number of time points using discrete
choice models due to lack of comprehensive data or simplicity of the analysis. Hence, the results
do not provide a full picture of mothers’ out of work duration and transition probabilities. By
employing a competing risks duration model, we can construct conditional transition probabil-
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ities for any point of the out of work duration. In particular, we employ the semiparametric
dependent competing risks model for cumulative incidences (Fine and Gray, 1999) to estimate
conditional probabilities of a transition to a risk taking place without imposing any identifying
restrictions on the interdependence structure between competing risks.
Finally, the German case since the 1980s is of particular interest for an international readership.
A number of significant changes in the leave legislation has dramatically increased the options
for the young mother to return to the pre-birth job. Hence, the German case sheds light on
the relevance of the legislative framework in shaping labour market outcomes of mothers. With
many countries having adopted similar maternity leave policies, this should be of great public
interest also beyond Germany.
We find transitions times to employment and unemployment clearly related to the design of
leave legislation with mass transitions taking place at the time the mother looses some form
of entitlement. We also find that extensive job protection periods of up to 3 years do not
simply lead to a later return to the previous employer but are related with higher probabilities
of making an employer change or giving birth to the second child towards the end of the job
protection period. Thus our results cast some question marks on the economic sense of key
elements of family policy in various European countries. At the same time we find evidence for
provision of child care to be suited to reduce maternity related out of work duration.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops some theoretical predictions regarding
the relationship between the different set of covariates and decision when and how to return
to the labour market. Section 3 describes the data and section 4 presents the duration model.
Section 5 presents the main empirical results.
2 A Framework for the Return Decision of Mothers
Economic models for the return decision of the mother have already been considered in previous
studies. For instance, Ondrich et al. (2000) focus on the question whether the mother stays at
home or returns to her previous job and apply their model to survey data from Germany. More
generally, the decision of mothers about the duration and exit state after maternity leave could
be interpreted as a dynamic discrete choice model (compare Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2010).
These models are increasingly popular for modelling the timing of economic decisions such as
the retirement date or educational choices. Although, these models are a powerful tool for
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applied economic analysis, they are only identified under a number of identifying restrictions
(compare Section 4). Given the large number of competing risks in our model and that some of
these states can be entered upon the choice of the mother while others require search (such as
finding a new employer), we only discuss plausible scenarios for expected utilities of staying at
home or changing to another state. We also present a number of hypotheses how the expected
utility profiles translate into realised transition times and probabilities. These hypotheses are
tested with data in the subsequent sections. In contrast to dynamic discrete choice models
our semiparametric statistical model avoids assumptions on the dependence structure between
competing risks, the distribution of covariates and parametric assumptions for the distributions
of failure times.
In order to develop some plausible hypotheses regarding the processes that take place after
birth, one needs to discuss the incentives for continuing the out of work period compared to
alternative states that a mother might choose. This choice set and the related incentives are
closely linked to the institutional setting. In Germany, there is a mother protection period
(MP) of two months after birth during which the mother may not return to work, but receives
full salary in the meantime. Afterwards, a mother is entitled to a parental leave during which
she may not be laid off by her pre-birth employer. This legally guaranteed job protection period
(JP) has been extended stepwise from 8 months in 1979 to 36 months since 1993, see Figure
4 (Appendix). In addition to this job protection period, women may receive a means-tested
benefit after the mother protection period. The entitlement period for this maternity benefit
(MB) has been prolonged stepwise from 4 to 22 months between 1979 and 1993, see Figure 4
(Appendix). The corresponding maximum maternity benefits that a mother may receive thus
also increased from a total of 1500 euros to almost 7000 euros during the entitlement period,
see Figure 5 (Appendix). Still, these benefits are rather low compared to a full time salary.
Hence, due to the institutional setup, mothers can decide to return to their previous employer at
any time after the mother protection period as long as the maximum job protection period has
not been exhausted. Moreover, women can usually choose between returning full- or part-time.2
After the job protection period, the employer need not re-employ the mother. However, having
the next child within the job protection period immediately renews both the entitlements to job
protection as well as maternity benefits. Hence, having another child within the job protection
period is another option that a women may seek. If, for some reason, returning to the previous
2Since 2001, women are legally entitled to return part-time rather than full-time unless an employer proves
that the job is not compatible with part-time work. Before 2001, there already had been a widespread and
increasing acceptance of part-time work which was reflected in an increasing number of part-time-friendly
collective labour agreements during the 1980s and 1990s.
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employer is not an attractive option, a woman may also seek entering a new job rather than
returning to the old employer. If she has not found a job yet, she may also quit her previous
job and register unemployed to possibly receive unemployment compensation. Finally, she may
also decide to enter education or training, become self-employed or start a minor employment
with only few working hours. Since of all these latter states tend to be rare, we pool them to
a residual category.
Therefore, we assume that a mother compares the discounted expected utility from staying
home and caring for her child full-time (UH,t) to the discounted expected utility from choosing
between
1. returning to the same employer full-time (UFT,t),
2. returning to the same employer part-time (UPT,t),
3. entering a new job with a new employer (UNJ,t),
4. registering unemployed and searching for a new job (UU,t),
5. having the next child (UNC,t),
6. entering other state (education, training, self-employment, minor employment) (Uoth,t),
with U... as the discounted expected utility when choosing a particular exit state in period
t. Note that two of these choices, namely having a next child and finding a new job, have a
random element such that the time of transition to these states cannot be fully chosen. Still,
the incentive to seek one or the other option should be driven by the corresponding expected
utility. For simplification, we hence assume that a woman stays at home as long as this option
yields the highest expected utility. She then switches to the state whose expected utility is the
first to exceed UH,t. Both the out of work duration as well as the transition state thus depend
on the time-varying utility differential between staying home and all other states. Hence, we
briefly characterize the utility associated with the most important states across time in turn
and derive a number of testable hypotheses:
The utility from staying home (UH,t) corresponds to the utility of caring for your child
fulltime plus the utility derived from receiving maternity benefits and having the option to
return to the pre-birth employer within the job protection period. We thus expect UH,t to have
downward kinks when the mother protection period with full salary compensation ends, when
maternity benefits are exhausted and when the legal job protection period ends. In addition, we
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assume that UH,t declines in between these kinks because the demand for fulltime care decreases
as the child gets older, see left panel of Figure 6 (Appendix) for a stylized profile. We can thus
derive hypothesis H1.
H1: Transitions should mainly occur at the kinks of UH,t. With the in-
stitutional changes as discussed above, these kinks in the distribution of
out of work duration are shifted accordingly.
The utility from returning to any type of work (UFT,t, UPT,t, UNJ,t) depends on the
expected wage income and job satisfaction related to the job minus childcare costs. The oppor-
tunity costs of not working should thus be highest for women with a high earnings potential.
H2: The higher a woman’s productivity and the better the availability
of childcare, the more likely a woman returns to (fulltime) employment
early after birth.
For women with good pre-birth job matches and a high level of firm-specific human capital,
returning to the previous employer should initially yield a higher level of utility than entering
a new job with a new employer. On the other hand, firm-specific human capital attached
to the pre-birth employer depreciates in addition to general human capital while staying at
home. In this case, the decline in the expected utility from returning to the previous employer
should exceed the decline in the utility from seeking an alternative job. On the other hand, the
chances to generate job offers that exceed the utility from returning to the previous employer
may deteriorate the longer someone stays at home.
H3: The shorter the job protection period and the better the pre-birth job
match, the more likely women return to their previous employer.
For some women, the pre-birth job may prove to be incompatible with family responsibilities
due to, for example, shift work or the lack of part-time schemes. In this case, a woman may
immediately seek alternative job offers. Hence, the availability of family-friendly job schemes
at the previous workplace may be decisive for the return decision.
H4: The more a pre-birth firm offers family-friendly job schemes, the
more likely a mother returns to her previous employer, albeit more often
in part-time.
The utility from unemployed job search (UU,t) corresponds to the expected return from
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seeking an alternative job offer and the receipt of unemployment benefits. If a mother registers
unemployed between the end of the mother protection period and the end of the job protection
period within one year after birth, she receives 67% of the wage earned in the year prior to
birth. When registering unemployed later, she receives 67% of a lump-sum fictive wage income
depending on her formal education. For most women, this fictive wage income is lower than
the actual wage income prior to birth, hence reducing UU,t at that point, see right figure of
Figure 6 (Appendix) for a stylized utility profile. Moreover, maternity benefits are deducted
from unemployment benefits, resulting in an increase of UU,t when these benefits are exhausted.
At the end of the job protection period, UU,t drops notably since, afterwards, women can
only apply for means-tested unemployment assistance at a lower level than unemployment
benefits. However, women with low pre-birth wages in low-income households that are entitled
to receiving social benefits on top of unemployment transfers receive a time-independent and
high wage replacement rate as indicated by the dashed line in Figure 6 (Appendix) increasing
the probability of registering unemployed early after birth. Finally, unfavourable labour market
conditions might deter women from quitting their pre-birth job as the chances of finding a new
job deteriorates, hence reducing transitions to registered unemployment. We can thus derive
H5:
H5: Transitions to registered unemployment mainly occur at the upward
kinks of UU,t during periods of favorable labour market conditions. Low-
productivity women in low-income households are more likely to enter
unemployment.
The utility from having a next child before returning to work (UNC,t) corresponds
to the utility derived from renewing entitlements to both job protection and benefits. If, for
example, the job protection length amounts to 36 months, a mother with three consecutive
children born at the end of the previous leave period can have a total of nine years with a
legally guaranteed return to her previous employer. For this reason, we assume that there is
a positive, but constant utility attached to having a child prior to ending the job protection
period. However, if the job protection period is too short to realistically give birth to a child
prior to the end of JP, this utility may in fact be zero. Moreover, whether having the next child
is the first alternative state whose utility exceeds UH,t likely depends on the opportunity cost
of staying home for a prolonged period which should be higher for high-productivity women
whose human capital is subject to depreciation. Hence, we derive the last hypothesis:
H6: The higher a woman’s productivity and the shorter the job protec-
tion period, the less likely she will have a next child before returning to
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employment.
We have thus identified a number of factors that likely affect a women’s decision whether, when
and how to return to the labour market after birth. In the next two sections, we will discuss
how we aim to test these hypotheses empirically.
3 Data
Our analysis uses biographical data in Germany (BASiD) that links administrative records
from the German statutory pension insurance scheme (Rentenversicherung) and the Federal
Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit). The data comprise of individuals holding an
active pension account at the end of 2009, i.e. who have at least one pension-relevant observation
until 2009 and have not retired yet. Since most individuals collect pension-relevant spells during
their education and work history, the 579K individuals that are included in the data constitute
a 1% random sample of around 96% of the German population.
The data contain daily spell information about employment periods, periods of training and ed-
ucation, periods of registered unemployment. The data also contain information about salaries,
basic demographic variables such as age and gender, firm characteristics and regional identifiers
among others. The distinctive feature of these data compared to similar German administra-
tive labour market data such as Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) is that, in addition,
they contain verified information about education and schooling periods and birth dates of own
children. Thus, these data allow us to determine the time of delivery and therefore the begin
of a maternity period. For more details about BASiD see Hochfellner et al. (2012). We restrict
our sample to females aged 18-45 who give birth to their first child in the period 1985–2005
and who were full-time employed at the time of conception. This latter restriction ensures that
we have a relatively homogeneous sample of women in terms of labour force attachment. As
a matter of fact, the majority of 90.2% of all women who give birth for the first time work
fulltime prior to birth. This leaves us with 19,535 women whose first births took place between
1985–2005.
From these data we construct maternity leave periods. Maternity leave is not directly available
in the data but is constructed from other information. By knowing the birth date of children
and having information about various other labour market states, we define maternity leave as
any unobserved period after delivery until the female is entering one of the following observable
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post-maternity states:
1. Return to the same employer full-time (UFT,t),
2. Return to the same employer part-time (UPT,t),
3. New job with a new employer (UNJ,t),
4. Registered unemployment (UU,t),
5. Next birth (UNC,t),
6. Other state (education, long-term training, self-employment, minor employment) (Uoth,t),
In our model, these risks are not assumed to be independent but there is independent censoring
at end of data in 2009. Table 1 reports the number of observed transitions and the share of
observed destination states in our sample. Around 38% of young mothers return to their former
employer (around 20% as part-timer) and around 13% change the employer. Almost a quarter
of women deliver their second child and add a subsequent maternity duration. Note that these
women could return to their previous employer later on. In fact, the total share of women
returning to the previous employer at some point amounts to 52%. This is compatible with
numbers from the German NEPS data3 that suggests that around 45% of all women return to
their previous employer at some point after the first birth. While we could have modelled the
next birth as simply prolonging the out of work duration rather than as a separate type of exit,
we decided to explicitly look at these transitions as the institutional regulations likely affect
the incidence of this state and likely prolong the out-of-work duration. Finally, a non-negligible
share of 15% register unemployed, while only 4% exit to some other state. Fitzenberger et al.
(2010) observe somewhat larger shares of return to the same employer and lower job separation
shares but this might be attributed to the fact that their data is from one large firm only.
In order to get a first insight regarding the timing of these transitions while taking account of
censored observations, Figure 2 presents nonparametric estimates of unconditional cumulative
incidences for the risks of interest. The cumulative incidence refers to the probability of having
experienced a transition to state j at some time period t in the presence of other competing
risks.4 Note that these cumulative incidences are on the grounds of pooled data from the
3NEPS refers to the adult survey of the National Educational Panel Study in Germany that contains extensive
biographies of almost 12,000 adults in Germany born between 1956 and 1986.
4The estimated cumulative incidences are obtained without assuming a specific dependence structure between
competing risks. Conventional methods such as the Kaplan-Meier estimator normally require independent
competing risks. Compare Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980).
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Table 1: Sample size and share of transitions into risks
Risk Freq. Percent
Return to job full-time 3,488 17.86
Return to job part-time 3,947 20.20
Job with new employer 2,490 12.75
Unemployment 2,969 15.20
Next birth 5,299 27.13
Other employment/education 447 2.29
Right-censored 895 4.58
Total 19,535 100.00
period 1985-2005, hence spanning different institutional regimes as discussed in the previous
section. Still, the cumulative incidences for returning to the previous employer in part-time
jump visibly at 36 months which is the maximum length of job protection for young mothers
after 1992, but we also see minor jumps when job protection ended under previous regimes.
Return to the previous employer in full-time appears to be less concentrated around these
expiry points compared to the return as a part-timer. Moreover, it is not surprising that there
are hardly any transitions to the former employer after this period has elapsed. Using similar
data, Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck (2014) also find evidence for the returns taking more likely place
around these points but only few in between or after 36 months. In contrast to Fitzenberger
et al.’s (2010) results we do not observe considerable increases in cumulative incidences for
the return after more than 3 years. Furthermore, as hypothesized previously (H3), employer
changes somewhat gain in importance relative to returning to the pre-birth employer after two
years and even more so after job protection has been fully exhausted after 36 months. Also,
transitions to unemployment seem to be strongly driven by the institutional regulations as has
been discussed in the previous section. In fact, transitions to unemployment jump strongly
after around 6, 12 and 36 months which correspond to maximum entitlement periods to job
protection and maternity benefits. Transitions to having the next child, on the other hand,
increase smoothly after the biological minimum of 10-12 months. Finally, transitions to other
exit states such as minor employment or education are only of minor relevance and will thus
not be in the focus of the subsequent empirical analysis.
In order to get a more detailed picture whether cumulative incidences respond to the kinks in the
expected utility profiles (as discussed in Section 2), Figure 3 presents the increase in cumulative
incidences for four different periods that reflect the increasing generosity of the leave and
maternity benefit regulations. See Figures 4 and 5 (Appendix) for the definition of these periods.
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Figure 2: Nonparametric estimates of unconditional cumulative incidences.
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The plots clearly suggest that the timing of transitions respond to the institutional design. In
particular, as suggested by hypothesis H1, mass transitions to the previous employer tend to
occur when job protection (JP) ends and/or maximum entitlements to maternity benefits (MB)
expire. Moreover, the peaks in the return to the former employer occur later as regulations
become more generous. This is in line with the literature on the impact of leave policies on the
return to work decision of women (compare Ondrich et el., 2003 and Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck,
2014). Transitions to another employer also seem to be affected by the institutional setting,
but transitions are much less concentrated at few mass points.
As suggested by hypothesis H5, transitions to registered unemployment peak when entitlements
to unemployment benefits (UB) are due to expire. Also, note that women are much more likely
to opt for registering unemployed rather than returning to employment if the leave regulations
are less generous, see also Figure 1. This indicates that in case of very short job protection
periods women are not willing to return to work and rather register unemployed than returning
to the previous employer even if that means loosing the legal right of returning to the pre-birth
job.
Finally, the share of females in maternity leave who directly deliver their second child increases
with the generosity of leave legislation as can also be seen from Figure 1. While these figures
provide some evidence that institutional regulations affect the incidence and timing of tran-
sitions to certain states differently, they do not allow for deeper insights into the conditional
distributions of transition times. In order to obtain a more detailed picture, we subsequently
estimate a multivariate competing risk duration model that relates transitions times to dif-
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ferent institutional factors and other characteristics (such as individual-, job- and firm-related
factors).
4 Econometric approach
As already mentioned in the previous sections, we apply a competing risks duration model with
six exit states to relate maternity leave duration to a number of variables. We therefore consider
a model with j = 1, . . . , 6 competing random variables Tj. X is a K × 1 vector of observable
regressors. Due to the competing risks structure it is only possible to observe (U, ,X) with
 = argminj{Tj} and U = minj{Tj}. Our model also allows for independent censoring with
censoring point C. Thus, observable duration is T =min{U,C} and let ∆ = 1I(U ≤ C)
with indicator function 1I. Let (tji, ci, δi,xi) be i = 1, . . . , N realisations of (Tj, C,∆,X) and
Fj(t; x) = Pr(Tj ≤ t,∆ = j; x) be the cumulative incidence curve for risk j. The cumulative
incidence corresponds to the probability that a transition to state j has occurred by time t.5
In empirical economics, the more frequently used approach to duration analysis is to estimate
the marginal distributions for each risk Pr(Tj ≤ t; x). However, this necessitates identifying
restrictions on the dependence structure between competing risks which are hard to test. The
Cox proportional hazard model, for example, assumes independent Tjs conditional on observ-
ables and the Mixed proportional hazard model assumes independent Tjs given observables
and unobservables. While for some research questions it may be informative to estimate the
marginal effects of covariates on the risk-specific marginal distribution, this marginal effect need
not, however, say much about the observed change in transitions due to the covariate change.
In fact, a transition to a particular risk may even decrease despite a positive marginal effect
if the positive marginal effect on the other risks is stronger. For this reason, the life sciences
tend to prefer modelling cumulative incidences that directly refer to observable quantities. For
our research question, we also consider cumulative incidences to be more informative as we
want to identify the effect on the observable sorting of women into different exit states after
birth. Another increasingly popular approach in empirical economics is estimating a dynamic
discrete choice model (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2010). In contrast to these models, the model
in our analysis does not impose identifying restrictions on the dependence structure between
risks (Assumption CI-Y in Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2010), does not require a specific covariate
structure (assumption DIS in Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2010), nor makes explicit parametric
assumptions on the distribution of failure times (assumption CLOGIT in Aguirregabiria and
5For more details about cumulative incidences see Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980).
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Figure 3: Increase in unconditional cumulative incidences for 4 periods (as defined in Figures
4 and 5 )
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Mira, 2010).
In order to estimate the risk-specific cumulative incidence, we apply the model by Fine and
Gray (1999) who consider the cause-specific subdistribution hazard function
λsj(t; x) = lim
∆t→0
1
∆t
P (t ≤ T ≤ t+ ∆t, δ = j; T ≥ t ∪ (T ≤ t ∩ δ 6= j),x)
= −∂ ln[1− Fj(t; x)]
∂t
.
This hazard is difficult to interpret but it is convenient to determine Fj from it (see below).
Fine and Gray suggest a proportional hazard model of the form
λsj(t; x) = λ
s
j0(t) exp(x
′βj),
where λsj0(t) is the nonparametric baseline subdistribution hazard. In this model the cumulative
incidence is
Fj(t; x) = 1− exp[−Λsj0(t) exp(x′βj)],
where Λsj0(t; x) =
∫ t
0
λsj0(u)du is the cumulative baseline subdistribution hazard. The marginal
effect of a continuous xk on Fj(t; x) is not simply βjk but
∂Fj(t; x)
∂xk
= (Fj(t; x)− 1) ln(1− Fj(t; x)βjk.
βjk therefore do not have a direct quantitative interpretation but they directly reveal the direc-
tion of the marginal effect on the cumulative incidence and the order of marginal effects across
regressors as |∂Fj(t;x)
∂xk
| > |∂Fj(t;x)
∂xl
| iff |βjk| > |βjl|. The magnitude of the marginal effect varies
with t but its sign does not change in t. This restriction on the direction of the marginal effect
also exists for the Cox proportional hazard model, where the sign of the marginal effect on
the conditional quantile function does not change across quantiles (Koenker and Geling, 2001).
In our application we determine marginal effects of continuous covariates as given above. For
binary covariates we evaluate Fj for both values of the covariate and take the difference in the
Fjs.
For completeness we sketch the likelihood function of the Fine and Gray (1999) model. In
absence of censoring they suggest a convenient partial likelihood:
L(βj) =
n∏
i=1
[
exp(xiβj)∑
k∈Ri exp(xiβj)
]1I{δi=j}
with Ri defined as {k : (Tk ≥ Ti)∪ (Tk ≤ Ti ∩ δk 6= j)}. Ri is the risk set at the time of exiting
maternity leave for the i’th female. In this model, parameters are estimated separately for each
15
risk. Fine and Gray also cover estimation in presence of censoring but the likelihood is much
more complex and therefore not presented here. λ0j(t) is obtained by a Breslow-type estimator
after βj has been estimated. We use the R package cmprsk by Bob Gray for estimation. We
use the bootstrap for inference.
When we discuss estimation results we focus on the estimated Fj as they have a direct in-
terpretation. Therefore, we also consider changes in Fj in response to changes in regressors
(partial effects). But notice, that each Fj is jointly determined by Pr(Tj ≤ t; x) for all j and
the dependence structure between risks (which is unknown). It is therefore difficult to draw
conclusions for changes in Pr(Tj ≤ t; x) when Fj changes.
Choice of Covariates. We have a comprehensive set of covariates, comprising individual
and firm level information in administrative registers, variables computed from the employ-
ment trajectories of individuals and linked regional and national aggregated data. We made
efforts to collect as many covariates as possible to be able to test the hypotheses of Section 2.
In particular, we require observable characteristics for a woman’s productivity, pre-birth job
match quality and the compatibility of her previous job with childcare responsibilities. Table
2 contains the list of covariates that will be used to capture these characteristics together with
institutional regulations, childcare availability and aggregate economic conditions. Column 2
links the covariates to the related hypothesis, while column 3 shows the data source.
For the individual productivity, we are able to exploit a woman’s entire pre-birth employment
and earnings history in order to generate useful proxies. In particular, we consider a woman’s
pre-birth wage quintile to be most informative. In addition, total work experience and past
unemployment experience may also proxy for a woman’s productivity level. The quality of her
job match prior to birth, on the other hand, is captured mainly by tenure as there is ample
evidence in the literature that good job matches tend to persist longer. In addition, we use
information on a woman’s career development prior to birth by creating dummy variables for
whether a woman climbed up or down the ladder in terms of earnings while working for her
pre-birth employer. We consider an upward move prior to conception to be a proxy for a
good job match. As further job characteristics we include information about the complexity of
occupational tasks and the probability of shift work or overtime by occupational groups. We do
not include the educational degree of the woman because of a high degree of misclassification
and many missing values (compare Fitzenberger et al. 2006, Wichert and Wilke 2012). As
educational degree and salary possess a pronounced positive correlation, the coefficients on
individual income will to some extent reflect the joint relationship of these variables with the
16
Table 2: Variables for the multivariate model
Variables Hypothesis/es Source
Individual productivity H2/H5/H6
wage (by quintile within year) A
total labour market experience (in months) A
past unemployment experiences (yes/no) A
Pre-birth job characteristics and match quality H2
tenure (in months) A
increase/decrease in pre-birth wage quintile A
complexity of occupation (3 categories) A
occupational risk of shift work/overtime A,F
Pre-birth firm characteristics H4
firm size (3 dummies) A
share of female pre-employer staff A
share of pre-employer staff aged < 30 A
Availability of child-care H2
child-care places per child aged <3 B
(annual state level data)
Leave legislation H1/H3/H5/H6
job protection period C
(4 dummies with < 10, 10− 12, 15− 18, 36 months)
maximum maternity benefit entitlements C
(in Euro, deflated in 1995 prices)
Labour market conditions H5
GDP growth rate (national) D
unemployment rate (by education/year/state) E
Further control variables
age A
inactivity/illness during pregnancy A
federal state of residence (dummies) A
decade dummies (1980s, 1990s) A
A - BASiD, individual level data; B - Federal Statistical Office, annual state-level data;
C - coded according to regulations as shown in Figures 4 and 5
D - Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture, annual data
E - IABS-04, annual state-level data by three educational levels
F - Mikrozensus (Census) - Federal Statistical Office, survey data17
length of maternity leave.
In order to proxy for the compatibility of a firm with family responsibilities, we include firm size
of the pre-birth employer since the possibility to offer part-time jobs and other family-friendly
human resource practices are likely to be more common in larger firms. In addition, firms
with a higher share of women among its workforce may be more compatible with childcare
responsibilities. In contrast, employers whose staff is pre-dominantly young and thus often
childless, likely puts less effort in offering family-friendly conditions.
We include a variable for the availability of public childcare places for children aged below
three to capture the institutional setting of a woman’s return decision. This information is
linked to our individual data based on workplace location and calender time. For the same
reason we include dummy variables for the leave legislation that applied at the time when a
woman gave birth and also include a measure for the deflated maximum amount of maternity
benefits a woman might be entitled to given the birth date of her child. Unfortunately, we
do not have individual level data on the actual entitlements to maternity benefits because
actual entitlements depend on household income, an information that is not available in our
individual data. The actual receipt of benefits does, however, vary less across individuals than
the maximum entitlement and therefore we expect that we underestimate the magnitude of the
relationship between benefits and maternity duration.
In addition, we include the national GDP growth rate and the unemployment rate that is
observed for a woman’s educational level in her state of residence in order to control for the
labour market conditions at the time of birth. Further controls that are not directly linked to
our hypotheses, but should be included in order to absorb unobserved individual heterogeneity,
are the age of the woman when giving birth, an indicator for her health status prior to birth,
and her occupation as well as time dummies for the 1980s and 1990s. These time dummies
together with the labour market conditions may help to disentangle the effect of institutional
changes across time from other influences that may also have changed across time. Finally, we
control for the state of residence in order to capture unobserved regional heterogeneity which
may stem from economic as well as mentality differences across Germany.
Finally, note that our administrative data does not include household level information that
may be relevant for the return decision, for example, due to income effects or due to the potential
availability of childcare by relatives. Given assortative matching, a woman’s productivity, for
example, is likely to be positively related to the income of her spouse. Hence, given these
omitted variables, our analysis can only recover the partial relationship of each of the included
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variables with the probability of observing a transition, holding all other variables in the model
constant. Hence, given the number of covariates included, our estimated marginal effects show
interesting relationships. But due possibly important omitted variables and by considering
cumulative incidences it is hard to relate our estimates to the data generating process. The full
variable list and descriptive statistics of our sample are given in Table 5 (Appendix).
5 Empirical Results
We have already discussed unconditional cumulative incidences and how they vary with policy
regimes in Section 3. As conditional cumulative incidences on the grounds of the multivariate
model confirm these observations we mainly focus on marginal effects in this section. For
completeness, we present estimated conditional cumulative incidences for a reference mother
in Figure 7 in the Appendix. Although, the level of the estimates is partly slightly different,
their general shape and the occurrence of mass points is rather similar to their nonparametric
unconditional counterparts in Figure 2.
In what follows we focus on presenting and discussing marginal effects on the risk-specific
cumulative incidences when we change one covariate (holding all other covariates constant).
These marginal effects correspond to percentage changes in the probability that a transition
to a particular exit state takes place at some point when the covariate changes holding all
other variables fixed at the values for the reference mother (compare Table 6). We report
these marginal effects at two lengths of maternity duration: after one year and after three
years. This allows us to test particular features of the hypotheses of Section 2 which suggest
changing patterns over the course of the duration. In contrast to Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck
(2014) who consider the event that the mother is employed after up to 5 years after giving
birth, we consider only up to three years. We do not consider a longer period because there are
only few transitions out of maternity leave after more than three years (compare Figure 3) and
cumulative incidences are broadly flat (compare Figure 2). Table 3 presents the corresponding
marginal effects for five of the six risks. We do not present results for the residual pooled risk
as these results would be difficult to interpret.
In what follows we discuss a the main findings of this table and indicate whether they provide
support (indicated byX) or provide evidence against (indicated by ×) the hypotheses developed
in Section 2. The full set of estimated model coefficients of the competing risks model is
presented in Table 7 in the Appendix for completeness.
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With regard to individual characteristics we find a strong differentiation of transition paths.
In particular, the higher a woman’s pre-birth wage, the more likely she returns to employment
(H2: X). However, this effect is driven by a differential rate of return to the previous employer
only. Women earning a pre-birth wage in the highest wage quintile are around 18 percentage
points (3 percentage points) more likely to be back in part-time (full-time) with their previous
employer three years after birth than women with the lowest wage level, while low-productivity
women are 2.5 percentage points more likely to start working for a new employer. Apparently,
women with higher wages and probably higher education levels have both a higher labour
market attachment as well as a higher attachment to their previous employer. Contrary to
our expectations though, and despite the lower employment rates three years after birth, low-
productivity women are less likely to register unemployed (H5: ×). At the same time, these
women are only somewhat more likely to have their next child directly after the first birth,
suggesting that a large share of these women experience a period of inactivity after first birth
that continues beyond three years. Moreover, mothers with past unemployment experiences
are more likely to enter unemployment but less likely to return to employment (H2: X). Also,
note that contrary to our expectations, individual characteristics do not seem to be strongly
related to the probability of having a next child within one or three years after birth (H6: ×).
With regard to job characteristics, tenure as an indicator of a good pre-birth job match in-
creases the probability of returning to the previous employer and decreases the probability of
an employer change (H3: X). We therefore confirm this finding by Fitzenberger et al. (2010).
An additional month worked for the pre-birth employer even increases the probability of having
returned to the employer by 0.7 percentage points three years after birth. Mothers who have
been recently demoted in the salary distribution are more likely to deliver their second child
out of inactivity and are less likely to immediately return the previous employer (H2: X), thus
resulting in prolonged out of work durations. Women who have been promoted recently, on
the other hand, seem to have particularly good outside options and are more likely to change
the employer. In contrast, if the pre-birth job is characterised by a high degree of occupational
complexity, this is related with a lower probability of employer change. Moreover, it is related
with a lower probability of unemployment but a higher probability of full-time return to the
previous job. The latter is also the case for low complexity occupational tasks, whereby these
are also characterised by a slightly higher probability of unemployment. The higher the proba-
bility for a shift work pattern, the more likely the mother returns full-time to her previous job
and the less likely she terminates the leave period by getting her second child or by becoming
unemployed. When there is a higher occupational risk of overtime, this increases the probabil-
ity of entering all states except the return to full-time employment to the previous job. While
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the latter finding suggests that systematic overtime working pattern may not be compatible
with family life, there is not similar evidence for shift work. Our findings therefore confirm
the broad observations by Fitzenberger et al. (2010) that promotions, job responsibilities and
intra firm standing of the young mother seem to play a role for her decision when weighting
her options. But due to data limitations their variables differ to the variables in our analysis
and results are not fully comparable.
Firm characteristics also play an important role. Mothers previously working with small firms
are less likely to return and more likely to end up in registered unemployment, while mothers
in large firms are more likely to return to the previous employer, albeit more so in part-time.
If we assume that large firms are able to offer a human resource management that facilitates
the compatibility of work and family responsibilities by offering, among others, more part-time
schemes, this is in line with our hypothesis H4 (H4: X).
Mothers working in firms with a larger share of females are more likely to deliver their second
child and change employer but less likely to return full-time. Given that we control for a
woman’s occupation, this may indicate that firms with a high share of woman reflect a work
environment that puts less penalty on working part-time or not returning for a prolonged period.
In contrast, a pre-birth employer with a very young workforce appears to push mothers to seek
alternatives as they are more likely to deliver their second child, end up in unemployment
or start working for a new employer, while returning to the pre-birth employer in full-time
decreases. As discussed in section 4, this might reflect that firms with very young and often
still childless workforces put less effort in being compatible with family responsibilities.
The variables reflecting the policy framework often have expected effects. In particular, a better
availability of childcare, and hence lower childcare costs, clearly increases the employment rate
of mothers and reduces the share of women who register unemployed or have their second child
out of inactivity (H2: X). This is a desirable result both from a policy as well as individual
perspective as childcare seems to preserve women’s labour force attachment and, hence, likely
also future career prospects.
An extensive job protection period, on the other hand, seems to be no good news from the
perspective of the previous employer who wants to preserve firm-specific knowledge. At least
in case of extensive job protection of 36 months, the share of women returning to the previous
workplace tends to decline while the share entering a new job tends to increase with the length
of job protection (H3: X). Moreover, a generous job protection strongly increases the share
of women who deliver their second child out of inactivity within three years after the first
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birth (H6: X). Note, however, that at least for a job protection of up to 18 months, there
is no parallel decline in the probability of returning to employment. Hence, the results also
indicate that women who are more likely to have their second child in response to a prolonged
job protection period are mainly the ones with prolonged periods of inactivity in case of a
less generous job protection. Our observation that the marginal effects are increasing with
duration seem to contradict some of the findings of Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck (2014). They
provide evidence for the effect of the job protection period on the probability of being in the
workforce declining in time from giving birth (5 years compared to 3 years). However, the two
sets of results are not directly comparable because they do not estimate transition probabilities
but the crude probability of being employed. Moreover, they compare 3 with around 5 years
after giving birth, while we only consider up to three years. We do not report marginal effects
for longer durations because there are hardly any transitions out of maternity leave after a bit
more than three years (compare Figure 3). Finally, the results of our regression type analysis
should be read as partial statistical relationships between observable quantities rather than an
attempt to uncover changes in the data generating process.
As expected, unfavourable labor market conditions as reflected in a high unemployment rate
make women exercise their right to return to their previous employer rather than quitting the
job (H5: X). Moreover, they tend to return in full-time. This may indicate that women want to
signal their attachment to their job in order to reduce the risk of being laid of. Moreover, higher
unemployment rates may disrupt the spouses wage income, hence increasing the necessity to
earn a higher income share. In fact, periods of high GDP and hence also wage growth, seem
to reduce the necessity to work full-time, hence again pointing to the relevance of an income
effect.
The results for further controls suggest that there are partly considerable differences across
federal states and decades. The latter observation is important as the policy variables may to
some extent also absorb general behaviourial trends in calender time.
While the above findings for particular covariates are certainly interesting and insightful, we
also consider the effects of changing a group of related variables (such as those related to
institutional setup, individual or firm characteristics) to obtain insights on the relevance of
variable groups for explaining variation in transition probabilities. Table 4 reports estimated
group effects, where groups of variables are as defined in Table 2. To make these effects
interesting and comparable across groups, we consider the switch from a “min” to a “max”
profile in each case. The “max” profile refers to the maximum probability for each exit state
that can be observed based on all covariates of a group, i.e. the (latent) linear predictor is
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Table 4: Estimated marginal effects of covariate groups on cumulative incidences (in %-points)
12 months after birth
next birth unemployment return full-time return part-time change employer
ind. productivity 0.114** 1.836*** 6.869*** 9.751*** 1.504***
job charact. & match qual. 0.340*** 1.700*** 7.772*** 5.693*** 2.790***
firm characteristics 0.210*** 0.957*** 3.969*** 5.142*** 1.122***
child-care 0.117*** 0.418*** 1.011*** 0.580*** 0.454***
policy framework 0.299** 1.634*** 9.601*** 5.037* 0.980
labour market 0.129*** 0.567*** 3.309*** 0.837** 0.381*
further controls 0.725*** 2.433*** 6.798*** 4.797*** 3.085***
36 months after birth
next birth unemployment return full-time return part-time change employer
ind. productivity 3.463** 7.852*** 9.467*** 16.803*** 3.930***
job charact. & match qual. 10.215*** 7.180*** 10.598*** 9.970*** 7.276***
firm characteristics 6.397*** 4.085*** 5.450*** 8.946*** 2.953***
child-care 3.605*** 1.776*** 1.391*** 1.013*** 1.190***
policy framework 9.707** 6.665*** 13.002*** 8.673* 2.589
labour market 3.971*** 2.401*** 4.550*** 1.463** 1.000*
further controls 20.726*** 10.431*** 9.258*** 8.529*** 7.892***
maximized. The “min” profile is such that it minimizes this predictor. For these profiles, we
fix binary variables to zero or one (depending on the sign of their coefficients) and continuous
variables at their sample means minus or plus one standard deviation for the two profiles. We
do not choose the continuous variables’s observed minimum and maximum because the edges
of their support could correspond to an outlying observation. Variables which do not belong
to the group of interest are held at the values of the reference mother (Table 6, Appendix).
The resulting marginal effect is the difference between the estimated cumulative incidences
for the maximum and minimum profiles. Hence, these effects yield insights into the relative
importance of different groups of variables in affecting the different transition types. We focus
the discussion of these results on the first five groups of variables as the group “further controls”
is only a remainder term capturing region and period effects. Several interesting observations
can be made in Table 4.
First of all, when focussing on the relative importance of the different variable groups for the
five transition types, we find that whether a woman has a next child within her inactivity period
is largely determined by job characteristics, match quality and leave legislation. Similarly, the
probability of registering unemployed is related to the leave legislation, although factors related
to individual productivity, job characteristics and match quality are also estimated to play a
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role. Note, however, that the marginal group effects for next birth and unemployment are
rather small at 12 months, but partly increase strongly after three years.
Whether a mother returns to her former employer strongly hinges on a mother’s individual
productivity characteristics. Women with favourable individual characteristics are 17 (9) per-
centage points more likely to have returned to the former employer in part-time (full-time) after
36 months. Moreover, our findings suggest that former employers may exert some influence on
a mother’s probability of returning in part-time, while returning full-time seems to be less in
the employer’s control. In particular, job and firm characteristics have a similar impact on the
probability of returning to the former employer in part-time than a woman’s individual pro-
ductivity (19 percentage points after 36 months). In contrast, the probability of returning to
the former employer in full-time is more related to leave legislation, especially after 36 months
(13 percentage points), while the leave legislation exerts only a comparably small effect on the
decision whether to return part-time. For a transition to a new employer, job characteristics
and match quality are estimated to possess the strongest partial relationships.
Finally, Table 4 also yields another interesting insight. While individual, job, and firm charac-
teristics exert the strongest impact on the probability of returning to part-time both after 12
and after 36 months, the policy framework mainly affects the probability of returning to the
former employer in full-time after 12 months, but the partial effect on transitions to a next child
increases much stronger within the following two years (9.4 vs. 3.4 percentage points). This is
interesting as it suggests that the window of opportunity for the policy framework to increase
the likelihood of a full-time return tends to be mainly within the first year of maternity.
6 Summary and recommendations
We present a detailed analysis of transition times from maternity leave into various labour
market states. We provide evidence for pronounced changes in distributions over a period of
almost three decades. In particular, part-time return to the former employer and giving birth to
the second child have strongly increased over the decades, while full-time return to the former
employer and becoming unemployed have decreased strongly. We find marked evidence for
mass transitions taking place at the time the mother looses some form of entitlement. These
mass points move over time in conjunction with changes to the maternity leave legislation. We
therefore confirm previous results for the decision to return to work (Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck,
2014) but show that similar patterns exist for most destination states in our model. Our results
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therefore confirm patterns of rational behaviour of young mothers when choosing their options.
Our findings exceed the previous international literature on maternity leave (Baum, 2003,
Hanratty and Trzcinski, 2009, Ondrich et al., 2003, Lalive and Zweimu¨ller, 2009, Scho¨nberg
and Ludsteck, 2014) by considering a multiple competing risks model and a number of policy
changes over almost three decades.
Although the share of transitions to unemployment has decreased from more than 30% in the
early 1980s to just over 10% in the mid 2000s, our results provide evidence that the unemploy-
ment insurance is systematically misused. Mass transitions into this state at legally relevant
time points reveal that unemployment (by claiming unemployment benefits) corresponds to the
state with the highest utility level for them. It is therefore advisable to have some hurdles for
mothers to enter unemployment while still in job protection. This might then also contribute to
a reduction in the considerably longer length of unemployment among females of child-bearing
age (Wichert and Wilke, 2008).
We estimate a competing risks duration model to reveal partial effects of each covariate and
group effects of similar covariates on conditional transition probabilities. We obtain evidence for
extensive job protection periods of three years being related with a higher probability of making
an employer change or giving birth to the second child towards the end of the job protection
period. However, only for very extensive job protection periods of 36 months this seems to go
along with reduced rates of return to the former employer after three years, suggesting that the
role of leave legislation increases in its importance for the return decision with the length of
the leave period. Given the results of previous studies (Baum 2002; Waldfogel 1997; Phipps et
al. 2001; Ziefle 2004) extensive job protection periods might therefore induce a long term wage
penalty for mothers. Our results therefore provide evidence for longer job protection periods
being related with longer economic inactivity periods and therefore with increased costs for
firms and the economy as a whole.
We also provide evidence for firm characteristics, individual productivity, job match quality
and the supply of public child-care being related with the observed differentiation of female
careers after first birth, broadly confirming our economic hypotheses. While characteristics
related to a mother’s productivity strongly affect the decision whether to return to the previous
employer, the policy framework has a notable impact only on the probability of returning full-
time or having the next child. Also, our results indicate that former employers may exert some
influence on a mother’s probability of returning in part-time, while returning full-time seems
to be less in employer’s control. This is an important finding as it allows firms to some extent
to avoid some costs related to filling the vacant posts temporarily and to retrain and hire new
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staff (Alewell and Pull, 2001).
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Table 6: Characteristics of the reference person used for the plots in Figures 3 and 7
Variable Value
wage 3rd quintile
labour market experience (months) 6.871
dummy for past unemployment 0
tenure at current firm (months) 3.566
decrease in wage quintile 0
increase in wage quintile 0
firm size 20 to 1000
share of female workers 0.622
share of young workers 0.394
firm information missing 0
child care places per 100 children 2.316
job protection 36 months
maternity benefits (in 1000 Euros) 5.035
GDP growth (%-points) 1.885
unemployment rate (%-points) 3.897
individual age 27.276
inactivity period during pregnancy 0
illness during pregnancy 0
job complexity level 2
risk for shift work (%-points) 6.2
risk for overtime (%points) 6.4
regional dummy Northrhine-Westfalia
decade 2000 to 2004
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A.2 Figures
Figure 4: Job protection periods and duration of maternity benefits by regime (with start date)
8
10
12
15
18
36
36
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
4
8
10
13
16
16
22
1979/7
1986/1
1988/1
1989/7
1990/7
1992/1
1993/1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
job protection (months) full salary (months) means tested benefits (months)
period 1
_______
period 2
_______
period 3
_______
period 4
34
Figure 5: Maximum cumulative amount of means tested maternity benefits by regime (with
start date)
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Figure 6: Stylized utilities by time elapsed since birth
(a) staying home (UH,t) (b) unemployment (UU,t)
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The plots sketch stylized patterns for the utilities attached to staying home (a) and registering unemployed
(b) by the time elapsed after birth. The level of the corresponding utilities as well as the exact slope of the
utility curves may vary across individuals such that the figures below only reflect the timing of major kinks
and general characteristics of the utility curves.
Note: “mp end” refers to end of mother protection period; “mb end” to the end of the maximum maternity
benefit receipt and “jp end” to the end of the leave-specific job protection period. “UB end” corresponds to
the time when the assessment base for unemployment benefit switches from the pre-birth earnings to a fictive
(lower) wage income.
Figure 7: Estimates of cumulative incidences for the reference person (see Table 6).
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